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Duration (Bergson) : ウィキペディア英語版 | Duration (philosophy)
Duration (French: ''la durée'') is a theory of time and consciousness posited by the French philosopher Henri Bergson. Bergson sought to improve upon inadequacies he perceived in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, due, he believed, to Spencer's lack of comprehension of mechanics, which led Bergson to the conclusion that time eluded mathematics and science.〔Henri Bergson, ''The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics'', pages 11 to 14.〕 Bergson became aware that the moment one attempted to measure a moment, it would be gone: one measures an immobile, complete line, whereas time is mobile and incomplete. For the individual, time may speed up or slow down, whereas, for science, it would remain the same. Hence Bergson decided to explore the inner life of man, which is a kind of duration, neither a unity nor a quantitative multiplicity.〔Henri Bergson, ''The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics'', pages 11 to 14.〕 Duration is ineffable and can only be shown indirectly through images that can never reveal a complete picture. It can only be grasped through a simple intuition of the imagination.〔Henri Bergson, ''The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics'', pages 165 to 168.〕 Bergson first introduced his notion of duration in his essay ''Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness''. It is used as a defense of free will in a response to Immanuel Kant, who believed free will was only possible outside of time and space.〔(The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ) ''Time and Free Will has to be seen as an attack on Kant, for whom freedom belongs to a realm outside of space and time.''〕 ==Responses to Kant and Zeno==
Zeno of Elea believed reality was an uncreated and indestructible immobile whole.〔Parmenides, ''On Nature''.〕 He formulated four paradoxes to present mobility as an impossibility. We can never, he said, move past a single point because each point is infinitely divisible, and it is impossible to cross an infinite space.〔Aristotle, ''Physics'', VI:9, 239b10.〕 But to Bergson, the problem only arises when mobility and time, that is, duration, are mistaken for the spatial line that underlies them. Time and mobility are mistakenly treated as things, not progressions. They are treated retrospectively as a thing's spatial trajectory, which can be divided ''ad infinitum'', whereas they are, in fact, an indivisible whole.〔Henri Bergson, ''Matter and Memory'', pages 191 to 192.〕 Bergson’s response to Kant is that free will is possible within a duration within which time resides. Free will is not really a problem but merely a common confusion among philosophers caused by the immobile time of science.〔Henri Bergson, ''Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness'', Author's Preface.〕 To measure duration (''durée''), it must be translated into the immobile, spatial time (''temps'') of science, a translation of the unextended into the extended. It is through this translation that the problem of free will arises. Since space is a homogeneous, quantitative multiplicity, duration becomes juxtaposed and converted into a succession of distinct parts, one coming after the other and therefore "caused" by one another. Nothing within a duration can be the cause of anything else within it. Hence determinism, the belief everything is determined by a prior cause, is an impossibility. One must accept time as it really is through placing oneself within duration where freedom can be identified and experienced as pure mobility.〔(The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ) ''For Bergson — and perhaps this is his greatest insight — freedom is mobility.''〕
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